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FOR WHAT MAY WE HOPE? THOUGHTS ON THE 
ESCHATOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 
JOHN E. THIEL 
After reflecting on the reluctance of modern theology to engage in 
eschatological speculation, the author argues that plenty of tradi-
tional Catholic beliefs warrant a rich exercise of the eschatological 
imagination. The life of the blessed dead provides a test case for 
such speculation, with Jesus' own resurrected life in the Gospels 
invoked as an interpretive measure for the resurrected life of believ-
ers. 
NEAR THE END of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), Kant took stock of his philosophical project by observing that all the interests of 
speculative and practical reason come together in three questions: "What 
can I know?" "What ought I to do?" "What may I hope?"1 Kant had 
already addressed and answered the first question earlier in the work, and 
in a way that undermined the very possibility of traditional metaphysics: I 
may know worldly appearances presented in the manifold of sense expe-
rience as ordered by the a priori categories of the understanding. There is 
no knowledge, he claimed, without sensibility shaped by the intellect. The 
second question would be addressed and answered in the Critique of Prac-
tical Reason (1788): I ought to act on the basis of the moral imperative 
constructed a priori by practical reason. 
Although addressed in the First and Second Critiques, the third question 
was not itself the subject of a book-length writing, undoubtedly because it 
functioned only as a heuristic for the second question. I may hope for a 
final happiness in God and a future life beyond death: "two postulates 
which, according to the principles of pure reason, are inseparable from the 
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[moral] obligation which that same [practical] reason imposes on us."2 God 
and life after death are hypotheses required by pure practical reason to 
ensure that morality finally will be its own reward, even if happiness proves 
elusive in this life. Hope in this Kantian key is dispassionate. It is not the 
emotional companion of an ardent faith. As mere postulates, the objects of 
Kantian hope do not evoke ardor, and hope, for Kant, is not the sister of 
faith, as Charles Peguy suggested.3 Rather, Kantian hope in the life to 
come is only a guiding principle that offers the possibility of rational con-
sistency and purposiveness to one's moral life here and now. 
It is with some irony that I have chosen a variant of Kant's well-known 
question for the title of a paper on the eschatological imagination. As his 
answer to the third question attests, Kant had no eschatological imagina-
tion. Kant would not have been offended by this judgment. For him, the 
faculty of imagination is incapable of eschatological employment since it 
requires the concreteness of sensibility to go about its business, and God 
and the afterlife are not possible objects of sensible experience. In the short 
essay that Kant did devote to eschatology, he makes this point clearly: 
"The speculative man [sic] becomes entangled in mysticism where his rea-
son does not understand itself and what it wants, and rather prefers to dote 
on the beyond than to confine itself within the bounds of this world, as is 
fitting for an intellectual inhabitant of a sensible world; for reason, because 
it is not easily satisfied with its immanent, that is, its practical use but likes 
to attempt something in the transcendent, also has its mysteries."4 And 
these mysteries, Kant continues, are the pseudo-concepts of "eternal re-
pose" served up by the various religions, concepts "in company with 
which . . . understanding disintegrates and all thinking itself comes to an 
end."5 
It is both expected and surprising that modern theologians have followed 
Kant's lead in their attention to eschatology. On the one hand, Kant's 
position on the limitations of knowledge has become axiomatic in modern 
theories of interpretation. Embraced theologically, it issues in the expected 
refusal of theologians to speak flourishingly about the afterlife. On the 
other hand, this epistemological modesty is somewhat surprising when one 
recalls that assertions about the afterlife are not claims for knowledge but 
claims made in faith. It is surprising that many modern theologians have 
chosen to observe the Kantian strictures on knowledge, since the under-
standing they construct is measured (or should be!) by faith in the Christ 
2
 Ibid. 639 (839 in the 2nd ed.). 
3
 Charles Peguy, The Portal of the Mystery of Hope, trans. D. Schindler, Jr. 
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmanns, 1996). 
4
 Immanuel Kant, "The End of All Things," in On History, ed. Lewis White 
Beck, trans. Robert E. Anchor and Emil L. Fackenheim (Indianapolis: Bobbs-
Merrill, 1963) 79. 
5
 Ibid. 
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event as revealed in Scripture and tradition. The apologetic interests of 
modern theologians do much to explain this anomaly. Concerned to justify 
their discipline before the canons of critical thinking, many theologians 
have been willing to embrace historicist assumptions in order to play by the 
same epistemic rules as fellow travelers in the academy. Or, better put, 
apologetic theologians make some interpretive negotiation between the 
value of critical knowing and the claims of revelation, since, they assume, 
neither can be consistently reconciled with the other on its own terms. 
This negotiation is more accomplishable for theological loci that address 
Christian realities within the scope of history. A theology of tradition or a 
theology of the church or a theological anthropology all interpret a possible 
object of experience, even if the claim be made that the sensible object has 
a supernatural orientation. Eschatology will have a much more difficult 
time satisfying apologetic interests. The "last things" are not possible ob-
jects of sensible experience but instead are objects of a hope inextricably 
tied to faith. For believers, the last things are not mere postulates but 
realities and events having to do with the very meaning of life and the final 
destiny of the human person. The subject matter of eschatology, then, 
explains the paucity of modern writing on this topic compared to other 
theological issues. And even when theologians address this topic, it is in-
teresting to see how much their work transpires as though Kant were 
looking over their shoulders. Abiding by Kant's own critical strictures, 
theologians who write today on eschatology often explore the existential 
dimensions of Christian hoping, and are decidedly reluctant to speculate on 
the objects of hope professed in faith. Eschatology then becomes a kind of 
"immanentology" in which talk about the life to come is really taken to be 
talk about life in the present. 
In opposition to this view, I will argue that theology should not be 
resigned to the Kantian despair of the eschatological imagination. Theol-
ogy on this side of the Enlightenment need not be embarrassed by meta-
phorical accounts of the afterlife, for such accounts can be powerful ex-
pressions of faith and hope. I will begin by illustrating the modern assump-
tion of proper restraint on the eschatological imagination in the work of 
Karl Rahner, proceed by proposing a traditional justification for a more 
speculative approach to eschatology, and conclude by considering how a 
richer use of the eschatological imagination might be theologically war-
ranted and religiously edifying. Any number of topics that fall under the 
rubric of eschatology could be enlisted to illustrate these points. In these 
pages, I will focus on the topic of resurrected life. 
ON GETTING IT HALF RIGHT: RAHNER ON 
ESCHATOLOGICAL ASSERTIONS 
A good example of the modern restraint on the eschatological imagina-
tion can be found in the writings of Karl Rahner, especially in his pro-
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grammatic essay, "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions."6 Here 
Rahner insists on the need for a special hermeneutics for understanding 
eschatological beliefs, a need that seems to be prompted by typically Kant-
ian assumptions regarding the limitations of knowledge. "The idea that 
such [a special] hermeneutics has been sufficiently catered for by herme-
neutics in general," Rahner observes, "rests on the false and primitive 
conception, that the eschata form a world like any other, so that knowledge 
of them—in spite of its being determined, like other knowledge, by the 
object itself—presents no particular problems apart from those of the 
knowledge of theological realities in general."7 Eschatology requires a spe-
cial hermeneutics precisely because the objects of its knowledge are un-
available, and unavailable in a way that encourages error in their interpre-
tation. Rahner reminds his reader that eschatology is about the real future 
that is God's, a future that lies beyond the control of human knowledge or 
action. God knows the future omnisciently, but God's future is also finitely 
knowable in principle by human persons, since human destiny is a crucial 
dimension of that future. Yet, acknowledging that God's future may be 
humanly knowable does not mean that God's future can be known in fine 
detail by human beings now, within the scope of history. Even though God 
could reveal everything of the end-time to humanity, God has not. More-
over, it would be erroneous to think that scriptural accounts of the end are 
"pre-views of future events."8 Such a view reduces the engaged believer to 
a disinterested voyeur who makes God's future "only what is yet to come 
from a distance, and no longer that which is at hand in its futurity."9 
A meaningful eschatology, Rahner argues, is one in which knowledge of 
the future emerges from the existential circumstances of the believer's life 
now. The future "is an inner moment of man [sic] and of his actual being 
as it is present to him now. And so knowledge of the future, in so far as it 
is still to come, is an inner moment in the self-understanding of man in his 
present hour of existence—and grows out of it."10 Eschatology must rec-
ognize the appropriate limitations on knowledge. Vain presumption beck-
ons the interpreter beyond those limits to conjure apocalyptic in the false 
forms of "phantasy or gnosticism."11 Eschatology, then, has cause for mod-
esty in its account of God's future, which in and of itself cannot be com-
pletely known, at least under the epistemic conditions of history. Eschatol-
ogy must speak strictly out of the present moment as the knowable way in 
which God's future is encountered in the life of faith. "By and in being 
6
 Karl Rahner, "The Hermeneutics of Eschatological Assertions," in Theological 
Investigations, vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore, Md.: Helicon, 1966) 323-46. 
7
 Ibid. 324. 8 Ibid. 328. 
9
 Ibid. 329. 10 Ibid. 331. 
11
 Ibid. 337. 
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oriented toward the future," Rahner claims, "[the human person] must 
know about his future. But in such a way, that this knowledge of the future 
can be a moment in his knowledge of the present. And only thus."12 
This last phrase—"And only thus"—voices Rahner's caution against ex-
tending eschatological assertions beyond their properly existential scope of 
meaning. The concerns of modern epistemology stir this caution, but so too 
does a particular understanding of God. Throughout his writings, Rahner 
delights in portraying God as holy mystery, as a wellspring of loving grace 
whose eternal depths defy comprehension even as they evoke the desire for 
meaning in human life. As the "Whither of transcendental experience," 
God remains "the nameless, the indefinable, the unattainable,"13 the infi-
nite mystery within which human persons discover and actualize the hori-
zon of their own finite mystery. The eschata are the fulfillment of the 
human quest for God. As elements of divine knowledge, they lie hidden in 
God's being. But more, as divinely willed and gracefully achieved human 
destiny, the eschata are a dimension of the mystery of God's own being 
and, as such, share in the infinite mystery within which human persons 
encounter the "more" of finite transcendence. For Rahner, the eschata are 
mysterious both for epistemological reasons and for ontological reasons. 
Human knowledge cannot help but fall short of divine being because hu-
man knowledge is limited, and divine being is not. Since the eschata share 
in the divine mystery, they defy speculative description on these two re-
lated counts. 
A good application of this position—at once Kantian and theological— 
can be found in another of Rahner's writings on eschatology. "The Life of 
the Dead." Here Rahner argues that the persistent courage of human 
transcendence in the face of life's seemingly insurmountable obstacles il-
lustrates the presence of eternity in time. Eternal life grows out of the 
present moment as human freedom responds to death productively, raising 
death from empty destruction to a radical limit before which persons be-
come fully themselves in choosing God. Death is only meaningful as deep 
loss, Rahner insists, when human life has become something to lose. And 
only a human life that has already entered eternity here and now by know-
ingly or unknowingly embracing God's future is worthy of death's mean-
ingful loss. "It is only because we have become immortal in our life," 
Rahner states, "that death with its menacing and impenetrable mask of 
destructivity is for us so deadly."14 Eternal life can only be spoken of 
meaningfully as the life of the living, since we are separated from the dead 
by the rupture of death. 
12
 Ibid. 332. 
13
 Karl Rahner, "The Concept of Mystery in Catholic Theology,'* in ibid. 50. 
14
 Karl Rahner, "The Life of the Dead," in ibid. 349. 
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Even though eternity can be encountered within our personal histories, 
the eternal life of the dead, Rahner claims, eludes our conceptual and 
imaginative grasp. While the living "are still creatures in time" the dead 
dwell in the mystery of "absolute nearness to God."15 Living within the life 
of God, the dead transcend the scope of our actual experience, and of their 
encounter with eternity, Rahner frankly admits, "there is not much we can 
say." Faith enables us to say at least that the mystery into which the dead 
have gone is one of "unspeakable bliss." Yet, "the sheer silence of [this] 
bliss cannot be heard by our ears."16 This respectful retreat to the ineffable 
certainly reflects Rahner's Kantian sensibilities. Yet, as I have argued, 
these Kantian sensibilities complement his Ignatian mysticism and, so 
mingled, emerge in a theology of God as inexhaustible mystery, a mystery 
into which Rahner enfolds the life of the dead. It should be no surprise, 
then, that Rahner extends the same apophatic regard for the divine mys-
tery to the blessed dead dwelling in the divine life. Just as imagination and 
expression are utterly humbled before the task of representing God, so too 
are these temporally bound powers humbled before the prospect of rep-
resenting the blessed dead, inaccessible as they are in the mysterious life of 
God. This dual apophasis, Rahner concludes, directs us to seek what we 
may experience of eternity only existentially in the present moment, where 
silence, and not speech, is the appropriate response: "we meet the living 
dead, even when they are those who are loved by us, in faith, hope and 
love, that is, when we open our hearts to the silent calm of God himself, in 
which they live; not by calling them back to where we are, but by descend-
ing into the silent eternity of our own hearts, and through faith in the risen 
Lord, creating in time the eternity which they have brought forth for-
ever."17 
Rahner's eschatological modesty is not an unusual stance in the trajec-
tory of modern theology. Both Protestant and Catholic kinds of liberal 
theology are governed by Kantian assumptions on the limitations of knowl-
edge, which require that one speaks of the last things immanently, if one 
speaks of them at all.18 The same might be said for Reformed theology in 
a Barthian style, which is happy to employ Kantian epistemology to war-
rant a classical Reformation understanding of divine otherness and the 
distance of the dead.19 But even if Rahner's position is generally illustrative 
of the modern deferral to Kantian sensibilities, it is especially interesting in 
15
 Ibid. 353, 352. 16 Ibid. 352. 
17
 Ibid. 353-54. 
18
 There are many examples. A good one is: Kathryn Tanner, Jesus, Humanity 
and the Trinity: A Brief Systematic Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2001) 97-424. 
19
 Barth makes this point nicely in his discussion of heaven in the Church Dog-
matics: "Heaven is the boundary which is clearly and distinctly marked off for man 
[sic]. It exists. But in distinction from earth it exists as invisible creaturely reality. 
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the way it advances those sensibilities through a theological understanding 
of God as mystery. As the heading to this section of my article announces, 
I am unconvinced by Rahner's argument in toto, though I am willing to 
concede the validity of one of his two principal points. Explaining this 
criticism will introduce the constructive portion of this article. 
Rahner is certainly correct in his view that experience and talk of the 
eschata grow out of the present moment and "only thus" may the eschata 
be represented theologically. Although this stance possesses a Kantian 
resonance in the modern period, it is difficult to deny that it is something 
of a truism throughout the entire Christian tradition, if not in theory then 
at least in practice. Aquinas and Kant hold remarkably different assump-
tions about reality. And yet both would maintain that the workings of 
imagination and understanding require the raw material of sense data, as 
does the speech that brings them to expression. Both agree that sensibility 
provides realistic content to our mental operations, even though they ex-
plain the formal contributions of subjectivity to the construction of knowl-
edge in different ways. Indeed, one of Rahner's signal contributions to 
modern theology is his retrieval of this Thomistic teaching on the indis-
pensability of sensibility for representation in light of the Kantian critique 
of traditional metaphysics.20 Rahner's retrieval demonstrates the real con-
sistency throughout the premodern and modern periods on the issue of 
theological representation, namely, that ideation and expression require 
the contributions of sensibility as the representable. It is no wonder, then, 
that Rahner discusses eschatology only out of the experience of the present 
moment, which includes, of course, the existentially-present past and the 
existentially-present future. Hermeneutical modesty about the eschata it-
self would require such a stance, were it not for the even stronger warrant 
that an alternative position could not be palpably imagined. 
Although Rahner rightly regards the present moment as a proper base 
for thought and speech about the eschata, there is no reason in principle 
that this safeguard against fantastic speculation need result in the theologi-
cal conclusions he reaches about the life of the dead. Rahner complements 
his position on the need for an existential eschatology by enfolding the 
dead in the divine mystery. This constructive stance in turn justifies his 
hermeneutics of eschatological statements. If the dead dwell within the 
It is invisible and therefore incomprehensible and inaccessible, outside the limits of 
human capacity. . . . It is not merely God who is incomprehensible; the same can 
also be said of heaven within the creaturely world" (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 
4 vols, in 12, ed. G. W. Bromiley, trans. G. W. Bromiley and Harold Knight 
[Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960] 3, part 3:424-25). 
20
 The classical locus is Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, trans. William Dych 
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1968). 
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divine mystery, then, like the divine mystery, they transcend the concrete 
particulars of thought and expression. Faith affirms the sheer bliss enjoyed 
by the blessed dead within the divine life, but the character of that state of 
blessedness is as indescribable as the divine mystery that both causes and 
occludes this bliss. Hermeneutical modesty before the eschata is appropri-
ate, Rahner thus claims, for two, mutually supportive reasons. First, re-
sponsible theological construction must respect the limitations on knowl-
edge set by the sensible conditions of representation. Although Rahner 
invokes this epistemological principle theologically, its Kantian resonance 
applies more generally to any form of speculation ventured by reason or 
imagination. Second, the nature of the blessed dead, engulfed as they are 
in God, demands that these epistemological strictures be respected for an 
explicitly theological reason that bolsters the cause of hermeneutical mod-
esty. Rahner extends the proper apophatic regard of faith for the divine 
mystery to the blessed dead as well, making silence the most apt theological 
response to the state of blessedness. The dead are distant from the present 
moment. And even though the present moment might be eschatologically 
constructed in meaningful ways, the afterlife is not capable of meaningful 
description. The kind of eternal life enjoyed by the distant dead, lost as 
they are in God's own mysterious being, constrains the eschatological 
imagination to the point of mystical silence. 
It is this second half of Rahner's double-sided position that I do not think 
is correct. For Rahner, the critical judgment that eschatology should re-
spect the legitimate boundaries of knowledge issues in a theological posi-
tion on the life of the dead that follows the Kantian rule on hermeneutical 
modesty.21 While there is good reason for a modern theology like Rahner's 
to respect the Kantian rule, there is no reason that the epistemological 
principles informing the rule need shape the representation of the blessed 
dead in the way they do in his theology. Indeed, I will argue that the 
relationships between and among several basic Catholic doctrines encour-
age the theologian to say much more about the life of the dead than 
Rahner is willing to say, even though he insists that it is proper to speak 
about the eschata in and through the present historical moment. While 
Rahner finds both epistemological consistency and theological profundity 
in what I would call his "thin" eschatology, I will argue that hermeneutical 
211 would be willing to concede that there may be no direct connection between 
Rahner's regard for the Kantian rule and his constructive position on the life of the 
dead. It may be that the consistency between the two positions is simply a matter 
of coincidence, that his theological construction of the life of the dead is not the 
consequence of his epistemological assumptions, and that I have committed the 
logical error of post hoc ergo propter hoc. But if that were so, it would seem to imply 
Rahner's own inconsistency in applying his special hermeneutics of eschatological 
assertions. 
HOPE AND ESCHATOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 525 
modesty does not require this approach, and that a "thick" eschatology— 
one that exercises the eschatological imagination more rigorously—can be 
much more effective in portraying "the assurance of things hoped for, the 
conviction of things not seen" (Heb 11:1). 
IDOLATRY AND SACRAMENTALITY 
Modern theology has been reluctant to engage the eschatological imagi-
nation for several reasons. The Kantian critique of metaphysics is one. 
Another reason, quite frankly, is the fear that any detailed account of the 
afterlife would simply be vulgar. This fear is not exclusively a modern 
concern. The Gospel writers were reluctant to describe the afterlife in any 
detail, even when they recounted what they received as Jesus' own words. 
The parables of Jesus consistently eschew a literal description of heavenly 
life, offering instead evocative images of the Kingdom of God that stir the 
human hope for fulfillment. Even though Paul claimed to have an ecstatic 
vision of paradise, he refused to describe it (2 Cor 12:2-4), justifying his 
silence by the sacredness of what he saw and, in an earlier letter, offering 
the believing community the same evocation of hope that the Gospel writ-
ers would: "no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived, 
what God has prepared for those who love him" (1 Cor 2:9). The Book of 
Revelation may seem to be an exception to this biblical reticence. A close 
scrutiny of the text, however, finds no description of the afterlife. The 
apocalyptic events it details occur in this life and not in the next. That these 
historical occurrences are portrayed through highly symbolic language 
seems to be John's indirect judgment that a literal description of the end-
time too would be vulgar and unworthy of the religious imagination. 
The New Testament silence on the afterlife tacitly condemns any sensi-
bility that diminishes the scope of fulfillment to the familiar, and, as a 
consequence, undermines the hope that faith evinces. But there is another, 
much more pernicious, kind of vulgarity that seems to be at work in both 
the ancient and modern constraints on the eschatological imagination, 
namely, the idolatry that traditionally has been understood as the root of 
moral evil. Christian salvation is so bound up with the mystery of God's 
divine life that any imaginative account of the afterlife seems to entail a 
literal description of God, as though images of the afterlife would force the 
reduction of God to an image of human making. Since idolatry is tradi-
tionally understood as the preeminent sin (Gen 3:5; Exod 20:4-6), heavenly 
description could be counted the work of invidious arrogance much more 
than the folly of epistemological excess. The age-old practice of negative 
theology, iconoclastic sensibilities, and the Kantian strictures on specula-
tive theology all in their own ways bespeak the same concern for idolatry 
in too lavish an exercise of the eschatological imagination. 
526 THEOLOGICAL STUDIES 
Sinful corruption, however, presupposes corruptible goodness, and here, 
in what Christian belief regards as the sacramental character of creaturely 
reality, one finds theological license for the eschatological imagination. The 
opening scene in Genesis affirms the goodness of creation, and sees crea-
turely goodness as a reflection of the Creator's own unbounded goodness. 
Medieval theology offers a thicker description of this creaturely virtue by 
speaking of the transcendental qualities of being, which, like God, is not 
only good but also one, true, and beautiful. The doctrine of the Incarnation 
consummates the doctrine of creation in the belief that creaturely reality is 
so good and redeemable that the divine nature could embrace it in the 
humanity of the Savior, and in the saving participation of that humanity in 
the resurrection of Jesus. Christian belief in the sacraments as means of 
grace confirms the capacity of finite existence to mediate the infinitely 
divine, a belief powerfully professed in the Catholic doctrine of the real 
presence of Christ in the Eucharist. Idolatry is an ever-present concern in 
theological representation, to say nothing of Christian life, because it 
moves in the same trajectory as authentic sacramentality, appealing to the 
same finitude of being as a communication of the divine, but now in a way 
that limits the divine to the given and circumscribable. Idolatry is reductive 
sacramentality, a constriction that ironically becomes a transgression of the 
proper terms of relationship between the divine and the creaturely.22 But 
prior to this reduction, in the created conditions of reality, lies a resource 
for eschatology that, though fallen, is both good and redeemed, and which 
might be put to good theological use. 
Having made the point that a fuller exercise of the eschatological imagi-
nation need not be idolatrous in principle, I hasten to make another. If 
eschatological representation is guilty of idolatry, it may be so in one of two 
ways. Eschatology always concerns the reality of God and the divine ac-
tions that bring about the eschata. An eschatology could be idolatrous by 
identifying God and God's eschatological actions with the creaturely. 
Idolatry of this sort is risked in all theological inquiry, as humanly limited 
concepts and language try as they might to grasp the infinite. But this kind 
of idolatry is perniciously accomplished in chiliasm—the literal reduction 
of God's actions to the events of history. Chiliasm is not a pressing theo-
logical problem in our time, although, as a warrant for ideological violence, 
it has increasingly become a political problem. As was noted earlier, mod-
22
 This understanding of idolatry as a perversion of sacramentality is suggested in 
the work of Marion and Chauvet. See Jean-Luc Marion, God without Being: Hors-
texte, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1991) 163-69; 
Louis-Marie Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament: A Sacramental Interpretation of 
Christian Existence, trans. Patrick Madigan, S.J., and Madeleine E. Beaumont (Col-
legeville, Minn.: Liturgical, 1995) 216-20. 
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ern theologians have been reluctant to engage the eschatological imagina-
tion, and so have not been seduced by this sort of idolatry. 
A second kind of eschatological idolatry would move in the opposite 
direction by elevating the creature in the afterlife to divine proportions. In 
one version of this excess, the creaturely contours of the blessed dead 
would be lost in an unqualified mystical union with God as God. Now, it is 
questionable whether there are actual examples of this kind of idolatry in 
the theological tradition, which, unlike the concrete chiliasm of the first 
kind of eschatological idolatry, would take the form of a spiritualized gnos-
ticism. Meister Eckhart has been accused of this kind of theological failure, 
an accusation magnified by his willingness to include the living as well as 
the dead in mystical union with God. Leaving aside the legitimacy of this 
charge, we need only note that Eckhart's style of mysticism is extraordi-
narily rare in the tradition, particularly when it is advanced as normative 
Christian faith and not as the heterodox criticism of it.23 The Eastern 
Christian tradition of representing the life of the blessed dead as a state of 
divinization is another example of mystical sensibilities pressed far. But this 
traditional conception of salvation has proven its orthodox status over the 
centuries by refusing to dissolve creatureliness into an unqualified union 
with God. 
Given the paucity of idolatrous representations of the creaturely dead as 
God, we can conclude that the modern reluctance to represent the blessed 
dead is not virtuous avoidance of a seductive theological temptation. In-
deed, the fear of this kind of idolatry seems to be stirred by a category 
mistake. Concerns about idolatry in the representation of the blessed dead 
derive from the false conflation of the afterlife with the divine being itself, 
and so the utterly erroneous assumption that a description of the afterlife 
would entail a reductive description of God. The biblical account of cre-
ation and the ancient Christian creeds speak of heaven as a created reality, 
and thus distinguishable from God even as the divine abode. Christian 
belief maintains that creatures do not lose their creatureliness in the after-
life. Speaking of the blessed dead cannot be equated with speaking about 
God, as much as God is gracefully implicated in any talk of the blessed 
dead. This point becomes even more important for the possibilities of the 
23
 Steven Ozment's helpful distinction between a Latin or christocentric mysti-
cism and a Germanic or theocentric mysticism in late medieval Christianity high-
lights the prevalence of the former and the virtual identification of the latter cat-
egory with Eckhart. See Steven Ozment, The Age of Reform 1250-1550: An Intel-
lectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe (New 
Haven: Yale University, 1980) 115-16. Cyril O'Regan's unfolding scholarly project 
explores the heterodox-critical varieties of gnosticism. See Cyril O'Regan, Gnostic 
Return in Modernity (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY, 2001) and Gnostic Apocalypse: Jacob 
Boehme's Haunted Narrative (Albany, N.Y.: SUNY, 2002). 
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eschatological imagination when one recalls that traditional Christian hope 
yearns for an embodied salvation. Whether the ancient metaphysical cat-
egories of body and soul or modern psychological categories of physical 
and emotional relationship are invoked to convey the reality of the human 
person, a Christian understanding of resurrected life insists on the holistic 
integrity of the saved self, and so properly rejects the notion of the real loss 
of the blessed dead in God. Like any dimension of authentic sacramental-
ity, the created integrity of the blessed dead could be idolatrously cor-
rupted by their false identification with God. Examples of this kind of sin 
in the tradition, though, seem to be rare indeed, if they exist at all. 
Another way of making this same point, and in a way that highlights the 
irony at work in modern theological practice, is that our very efforts to 
avoid idolatry themselves give rise to idolatry. Our theological avoidance 
of talk about the eschata intends to honor the distance between the divine 
and the human. And yet, that very gesture itself succumbs to the idolatrous 
assumption that the proximity of the blessed dead to God warrants their 
regard through an apophatic lens properly reserved for God. Our good 
theological intentions fail by making too much of the blessed dead and so, 
by consequence, too little of God, and all in the name of rigorous theo-
logical method or mystical profundity. 
When all is said and done, the modern reluctance to represent the 
blessed dead issues as much from Reformation sensibilities about authentic 
sacramentality as it does from Kantian sensibilities about the limits of 
knowledge. The Reformers vehemently attacked the Catholic belief in and 
practice of the cult of the saints, since it implicated all the neuralgic points 
of dispute among 16th-century Christians. The Reformers saw idolatry in 
Catholic veneration of the saints, judging saintly patronage in the afterlife 
to usurp the mediating role of Christ as Savior. In the view of the Reform-
ers, the saints in heaven valorized the religious actions of ascetics from 
whom their ranks were drawn. The blessed dead exercised a sacred agency 
that compromised the very strong doctrine of grace at the heart of Refor-
mation spirituality. Reformation faith thus embraced the notion of the 
blessed dead as distant from the living. In the afterlife, they were enfolded 
into the predestinating will of God by which they were chosen from all 
eternity. The afterlife of the saints was unimaginable because only the 
activity of the blessed dead is seriously imaginable, and, in the Reformation 
reading of Paul, human activity has no graceful integrity of its own. 
This last point may serve as a transition to the next step in our argument. 
If Reformation and Kantian sensibilities have mutually configured modern 
assumptions about the eschatological imagination, then Catholic sensibili-
ties need to adjudicate the extent to which these concerns are appropriate 
to its task. Modern Catholic theology rightly has learned much from Kant 
about the limits of knowledge and the excesses of traditional metaphysical 
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speculation. But Catholic theology should be wary of granting final episte-
mic authority to philosophical strictures that would have disallowed the 
great artistic, poetic, and theological exercises of the religious imagination 
throughout the Catholic tradition. The unity of that tradition suggests that 
the scandal of an excluded past would make for an equally scandalous 
present or future. And even though Kantian epistemology nicely supports 
Protestant sensibilities on the unavailability of the blessed dead, there is no 
reason at all for Catholic theology to relinquish its peculiar style of Chris-
tian sensibility to embrace a style not its own, however typical that style 
may now be. The challenging task for a Catholic theology is not just to 
imagine the blessed dead, but more importantly to imagine the blessed 
dead in ways that are faithful to the mainstays of Catholic belief and in 
ways that may serve as icons of hope for believers. It is to that task that we 
now turn. 
WHAT DOES JESUS DO IN THE AFTERLIFE? 
Caroline Walker Bynum has observed that to "twentieth-century non-
Christians and Christians alike, no tenet of Christianity has seemed more 
improbable—indeed, incredible—than the doctrine of the resurrection of 
the body."24 Anyone who knows the rich ways that bodily resurrection 
animated the faith of premodern believers cannot help but be struck by its 
absence in contemporary Christian belief. When contemporary Christians 
imagine the afterlife, they tend to do so dualistically, as the continuance of 
a disembodied soul. Thinking in the manner of ancient Platonists, they 
assume that the fullness of the self resides in its invisible dimensions, 
beyond the fluctuations of the body that eventually are rife with old age, 
disease, and death. The creed, however, professes belief in the resurrection 
of the body and so insists on an afterlife in which the entire person is saved. 
Ancient Christians not only believed in bodily resurrection but also went to 
great lengths to imagine how it would occur and how it would perdure, as 
their art and theological speculation testify.25 The resurrected Jesus was a 
paradigm for their religious imaginings, and we would do well to follow 
their time-honored example by making the resurrected Jesus a paradigm 
for imagining the life of the blessed dead in the pages to follow. 
Paul's discussion of the afterlife in 1 Corinthians 15 is the earliest Chris-
tian testimony to Jesus' resurrection as a model for the resurrection of 
24
 Caroline Walker Bynum, "Material Continuity, Personal Survival, and the 
Resurrection of the Body: A Scholastic Discussion in its Medieval and Modern 
Contexts," in Fragmentation and Redemption: Essays on Gender and the Human 
Body in Medieval Religion (New York: Zone, 1991) 239. 
25
 See Carolyn Walker Bynum, The Resurrection of the Body in Western Chris-
tianity, 200-1336 (New York: Columbia University, 1995). 
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believers. For Paul, the denial of the resurrection of the dead on the part 
of the new Corinthian converts amounted to a denial of Jesus' resurrection, 
since, Paul infers, the resurrection of Jesus is the graceful source and cause 
of resurrection itself (1 Cor 15:12-19). Yet, Jesus' resurrection remains in 
the background of Paul's concerns as he tries to sketch a holistic account of 
the believer's resurrected life. The narrative commitments of the later 
evangelists put the resurrected Jesus in full view of the believer as a para-
digm for imagining the afterlife. In its original form, the Gospel of Mark 
portrays the resurrection of Jesus only in the powerful image of the empty 
tomb. The resurrected Jesus makes no appearance (Mk 16:1-8), as he does 
in the longer ending and in the later Gospels. Matthew includes two ap-
pearance scenes—to the women leaving the tomb and to the disciples in the 
closing passage—that offer little detail of Jesus' new resurrected life (Mt 
28:9-10, 16-20). Luke and John make much of post-Easter appearances, 
writing elaborately of Jesus' resurrected life. As different as their accounts 
of the post-Easter Jesus are, these Gospel writers share some common 
understandings of the appearances, and these similarities can inform our 
project. 
It is a commonplace in the interpretation of the later resurrection ap-
pearances to highlight the issue of Jesus' identity, and to do so by stressing 
the reality of Jesus' resurrected body. Both Luke and John acknowledge 
that Jesus' resurrected body is different from his body before Easter. His 
resurrected body is not easily recognized, as demonstrated in Luke's story 
of the disciples on the road to Emmaus (Lk 24:13-32) and John's story of 
Mary Magdalene mistaking the resurrected Jesus for the gardener (Jn 
20:11-16). His body appears or disappears miraculously, and so is not 
subject to the ordinary conditions of finite existence (Lk 24:31, 36, 51; Jn 
20:19,26). The Evangelists make the very same point about the resurrected 
Jesus that Paul had made about resurrected' life decades earlier—that the 
body in resurrection transcends the limitations of the body in death (1 Cor 
15:42-44). And yet, while acknowledging the saved and saving difference in 
the person of the resurrected Lord, both Luke and John are especially 
intent on showing that this Jesus is the same person who was born and lived 
and died on the cross. Both do so by having the resurrected Jesus make his 
wounded body the proof of his identity. The Lucan account has Jesus say 
to his startled disciples before whom he has appeared: "'Look at my hands 
and my feet; see that it is I myself. Touch me and see; for a ghost does not 
have flesh and bones as you see that I have'" (Lk 24:39). In one of the most 
compelling scenes in all the Gospels, John has the disciple Thomas make 
the crucifixion wounds the proof of Jesus' resurrected identity, and Jesus is 
happy to oblige when he appears to him (Jn 20:24-29). 
Interpretive attention to Jesus' embodied identity in the resurrection is 
an important corrective to the dualistic understandings of afterlife that 
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prevail in contemporary Christian communities. If Jesus' afterlife is nor-
mative for the afterlife of believers, then the New Testament narratives 
insist on the indispensability of embodiment for identity, and so for the 
saved identity of the blessed dead. And yet, this close relationship between 
identity and embodiment can occlude other aspects of Jesus' resurrected 
identity that are just as crucial for the eschatological imagination. Embodi-
ment, after all, can be conceived statically, as a state of being conveyed by 
the mere fact of physicality. There is a sense in which Jesus' demonstrative 
use of his body as a marker of continuous identity in Luke and John 
encourages such a view. Considered in this way, embodiment is a quality of 
identity as inert as a metaphysical essence. I propose that we broaden the 
scope of Jesus' resurrected identity by attending to his embodied actions in 
the appearance scenes. These actions, Jesus' "doing" in his resurrected life, 
can enliven our imagination about the life of the blessed dead. 
What does Jesus do in his resurrected life? According to both the 
Apostles' Creed and the Nicene Creed, Jesus is "seated at the right hand 
of the Father" and he "will come again" to judge the living and the dead.26 
A literal reading of the ancient professions of faith seems to suggest that 
the resurrected Jesus is inactive, waiting until the end of time to continue 
his saving work as the Son of God. Luke and John imagine things differ-
ently. Even though these Gospels together offer precious few pages on the 
resurrected life of the risen Lord, they do consistently present the identity 
of Jesus through his actions. The richness of Scripture, its own fecund 
sacramentality, offers many possible descriptions of such actions.271 would 
like to focus on the following: the way that Jesus keeps his promises, bears 
the pain of his life without reproach, reconciles failure, and shows himself 
to be who he is. 
Fulfillment is the most obvious theme that runs through the resurrection 
accounts. The Gospel writers narrate the resurrection of Jesus as they do 
to proclaim the truth that all lives, all of creation, and all of history have 
been fulfilled in the Easter event. All four Gospels express this fulfillment 
through the image of the empty tomb, and the Synoptic Gospels bring this 
image to clear articulation in the announcement of the resurrection by 
26
 Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum, et declarationum de rebus fidei et mo-
rum, ed. Henricus Denzinger and Adolfus Schonmetzer, S.J. (Freiburg im Briesgau: 
Herder, 1967) nos. 30, 150. 
27
 On the sacramentality of Scripture, see Chauvet, Symbol and Sacrament 213-
27. One might object that the resurrection appearances of Jesus in the Gospels are 
themselves exercises of the theological imagination and so are poor warrants for the 
theological speculation offered here on the life of the blessed dead. I agree that the 
appearance stories in Scripture are acts of theological imagination in narrative 
form. Yet, their canonical status authorizes these imaginative acts as God's inspired 
word. Imagination and authority need not be disjunctively posed in the life of faith. 
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heavenly messengers. We should note, though, that this fulfillment is some-
thing that Jesus does, not only in the eventfulness of the resurrection itself 
but also in the way that this event is his keeping of a promise. Mark's 
Gospel makes this point most clearly. Mark presents the resurrection of 
Jesus as a dramatic surprise after the seemingly hopeless tragedy of Jesus' 
tortuous death. Yet, Mark expects that surprise will be transformed into 
purpose as readers recall the crucial scene at the center of the Gospel in 
which Jesus' identity is under discussion. In response to Jesus' question, 
"'But who do you say that I am?'" (Mk 8:29), Peter declares that Jesus is 
the Messiah. This response prompts Jesus to explain what being the Mes-
siah means: "Then he began to teach them that the Son of Man must 
undergo great suffering, and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests, and 
the scribes, and be killed, and after three days rise again" (Mk 8:31). Even 
though this passage characterizes Jesus' explanation as instruction, the 
Easter event seems to raise it to the heights of promise, and, in light of the 
Easter event, to the summit of a promise fulfilled. 
Promises are the most important words that persons speak, since they 
extend personal relationship into an unseen future in which faithfulness 
may be broken. A promise bespeaks constancy of character. It verbalizes 
the speaker's most serious intention to be a committed self beyond the 
present moment. A promise kept is the fulfillment of personal character as 
it stands in relation to others, and that fulfillment is achieved in the 
struggles that keeping a meaningful promise entails. If we consider Jesus in 
resurrection as someone who has kept his promise to be the risen Lord, 
then this is a promise that he has made to be most fully himself by facing 
the trial of torture and death so that, through his resurrection from the 
dead, God could destroy death for all.28 
The role of the crucifixion in the fulfillment of Jesus' promise to save the 
world brings us to another of his activities in the afterlife. The resurrected 
Jesus bears the pain of his life without reproach. This forbearance is not 
simply resurrection behavior but extends from Good Friday to Easter and 
beyond. Jesus remains an innocent victim throughout his false indictment, 
his torture, and his terrible execution. And though innocent, he refuses to 
reproach the many agents of imperial power who enact its violence. In 
resurrection, Jesus continues to act in this way. He calls attention to his 
wounds in order to stir the resurrection faith of his disciples. But he does 
not lay blame for their infliction, either historically by mention of Roman 
281 have developed this theological motif at length in my God, Evil, and Innocent 
Suffering: A Theological Reflection (New York: Crossroad, 2002). This same motif 
is developed from another angle in James Alison, Raising Abel: The Recovery of the 
Eschatological Imagination (New York: Crossroad, 1996). 
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violence or the betrayal of a friend, or theologically by mention of sinful 
humankind. 
Jesus' disposition in this regard offers an interesting contrast to Job's in 
the face of his innocent suffering. In order to make the innocence of Job's 
suffering utterly clear, the book's author leaves no doubt in the opening 
scene that it is God, and not Job, who bears responsibility for all the evil 
that suddenly befalls the just man (Job 1-2). Job voices his innocence with 
like clarity. His eloquent speeches lament the terrible injustice that has 
been done to him. He reproaches God for what he rightly believes is God's 
guilt, and he reproaches his friends for their pious defenses of God and 
their easy willingness to blame the victim. In noting this difference between 
Jesus and Job, I do not mean to suggest that Job's response is inappropri-
ate. Job's lament is courageously prophetic. Railing against the injustice of 
his suffering, he speaks righteously on behalf of any faithful believer beset 
by undeserved suffering. His words attempt to end the violence that has 
entered his life by naming its cause. Jesus, of course, is no stranger to 
prophetic speech of this sort. In scene after Gospel scene he speaks against 
the power of evil at work in the world, and especially against its effects in 
the lives of the marginalized. Jesus, though, does not raise his voice to 
protest or to blame with regard to his own suffering, either before or after 
the resurrection. In the afterlife, Jesus' wounds identify who he is, but they 
are not his evidence for the injustice done to him or for the guilt of the 
perpetrators. Jesus' unwillingness to reproach his offenders defines a 
higher standard of moral response that achieves an eschatological clarity in 
his resurrected life, when the irreversible evil done to him cannot be 
checked by lament, and reproach would only perpetuate the reciprocity of 
blame that makes new victims. Job himself may approach this higher stan-
dard in his final silence before God (Job 42:1-6). 
Another activity of the resurrected Jesus is his reconciliation of failure. 
The Gospels consistently agree that Jesus died alone. Jesus and his message 
may have inspired discipleship in the later years of his life, but the specter 
of the cross led his disciples to flee in the face of danger and worldly 
judgment. Scripture scholars often point out that the disciples' abandon-
ment of Jesus is such a scandal for the early church that its acknowledg-
ment in all four Gospels is strong evidence of its historicity. Certainly this 
most bitter of injustices, at the hands of friends and not strangers, must be 
counted first among those that Jesus does not reproach. In spite of this 
terrible offense, the resurrected Jesus both forgives failure and carries his 
forgiveness to the point of reconciliation. The best example of this relent-
less forgiveness appears in Jesus' reconciliation of Peter in John's Gospel. 
In the Gospel's closing scene, Jesus asks Simon Peter three times if he loves 
him, and three times Peter affirms his love. With each affirmation, Jesus 
presses Peter into the commitment that he lacked the night before Jesus 
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died, when Peter, fearing his own arrest, three times denied his association 
with Jesus. The resurrected Jesus does the work of reconciliation not only 
by the symmetry of his forgiveness but also by entrusting Peter with re-
sponsibility for the nascent church. With every confession of Peter's love, 
Jesus urges his care toward the faithful with the words, "Feed my lambs," 
"Tend my sheep," "Feed my sheep" (Jn 21:15-17). It is Jesus who allows 
Peter to mend their broken relationship, and it is Jesus who strengthens 
their renewed friendship by a remarkable act of faith in their future to-
gether. Having denied Jesus and, by so doing, having participated in the 
breaking of his body, Peter now is charged with the task of nurturing the 
body of Christ in the world.29 
The final activity of the resurrected Jesus that I would like to consider is 
the way he shows himself to be who he is. In his important book The 
Identity of Jesus Christ, Hans Frei makes the interesting observation that 
Jesus is most himself in his resurrection.30 This claim seems rather strange 
to a time in which the question of Jesus' identity is typically answered by 
yet another scholarly reconstruction of the historical Jesus. Frei approaches 
the identity of Jesus in quite a different way by attending to Jesus' char-
acter, his integrity as a person. Jesus' character cannot be described on the 
basis of historical evidence, for such evidence is lacking and, even more, 
holds little interest for faith. A believer's regard for the person of Jesus has 
all the evidence it needs in the biblical narrative where Jesus' character 
takes shape in the events of his life, death, and resurrection. 
In describing Jesus' character, Frei resists the modern inclination to 
think of identity as a function of subjectivity. Personal identity, he argues, 
does not well up in inner feelings but takes shape as one's intentions are 
consistently brought to action in the course of life. This rather un-Romantic 
and empirical approach to identity might seem more compatible with the 
historian's rational regard for Jesus up to the point of his death. To the 
contrary, Frei maintains that the Gospels portray Jesus not simply as a 
person who said and did things from birth to death, but as a person whose 
words and deeds are consummated in his resurrection from the dead. As 
Frei puts it: "To know who he is in connection with what took place is to 
know that he is. This is the climax of the story and its claim. What the 
accounts are saying, in effect, is that the being and identity of Jesus in the 
resurrection are such that his nonresurrection becomes inconceivable."31 
The resurrection is not an event that functions as a kind of "add-on" to 
29
 Rowan Williams makes this same scene the cornerstone for his reflections on 
the meaning of forgiveness in the light of Jesus' resurrection. See Rowan Williams, 
Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel (Cleveland: Pilgrim, 2002) 23-44. 
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 Hans W. Frei, The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of Dog-
matic Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975) 139-52. 
31
 Ibid. 145. 
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Jesus' life, even one in which he becomes extrinsically "more" than he was 
prior to his resurrection. For Frei, the resurrection is the event that pro-
vides unity to all that Jesus said and did, such that Jesus becomes most fully 
who he is precisely in his resurrection from the dead. By the same token, 
we can say that all that Jesus says and does in his afterlife stands in con-
tinuity with his preceding character-forming words and deeds. 
Frei makes a wonderful observation here that describes exactly how 
believers encounter Jesus' graceful presence, itself a function of who he is 
believed to be, namely, the risen Lord. This last activity of the resurrected 
Jesus—that he shows himself to be who he is—is actually a more general 
account of the other activities that we have already considered, all of which 
manifest Jesus' identity by demonstrating his character in action. It would 
be interesting to consider whether and how Frei's observation about the 
resurrected Jesus applies to believers in ways that can allow us to speculate 
meaningfully about their own resurrected life. 
JESUS' RESURRECTED LIFE AND OURS 
Jesus' resurrected life is interesting in its own right, as everything about 
him is. Our interest in his eschatological deeds, though, has been prompted 
by what they might mean for the resurrected life of believers. The Christian 
belief that our common humanity shares in Jesus' resurrected life justifies 
this comparison, as does the way that Jesus' actions set the standard for 
Christian discipleship. And yet, whatever homologies between Jesus and 
believers justify our comparison, there are important differences to con-
sider. First and foremost, Jesus is the Savior, the divine Son of God, and so 
is exceptional in every respect, including his resurrection. Jesus' resurrec-
tion is not the received gift of eternal life, as is ours, but the gift itself, the 
event that redeems the world. Moreover, Jesus' bodily resurrection occurs 
three days after his death. In Christian belief, the bodily resurrection of 
believers does not occur until the last judgment.32 Until that event, the 
disembodied souls of the blessed dead experience the fulfillment of heav-
enly life. This difference between Jesus' resurrection and our own means 
that we cannot speak literally of the embodied actions of believers in 
resurrected life until the miracle of bodily resurrection has taken place. 
It is important to note, however, that the tradition has affirmed a real 
consistency in the life of the blessed dead before and after the eschato-
32
 With respect to modern theological interpretation of this belief, I agree with 
Josef Ratzinger, who resists all attempts to interpret bodily resurrection as an event 
that occurs individually and immediately upon death. See Joseph Ratzinger, Es-
chatology, Death, and Eternal Life, trans. Michael Waldstein (Washington: Catholic 
University of America, 1988) 241-60. 
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logical union of body and soul. This is expressed most clearly in the four-
teenth-century teaching of Benedict XII. Condemning the theological 
views of his predecessor John XXII, Benedict taught that the disembodied 
soul in heavenly bliss enjoys the fullness of the beatific vision, and that the 
resurrected union of soul and body after the last judgment adds nothing to 
this experience. John held the view that bodily resurrection was required 
for the beatific vision to occur at all, since the metaphysical integrity of the 
person dwells in the union of body and soul. John thus imagined a heavenly 
wait for the soul in a diminished afterlife before the resurrection, deprived 
of the beatific vision. The purport of Benedict's authoritative teaching was 
that saved persons do not experience varying degrees of heavenly bliss 
throughout their lives in blessedness. The resurrection adds nothing to the 
redeemed encounter with God in the beatific vision.33 It is interesting to 
notice that the same religious concerns motivated both sides in this dis-
agreement. The integrity of the saved person mattered to both John and 
Benedict, the former finding it in the unity of the soul and body and the 
latter in the unity of undiminished, heavenly joy. In this controversy, as in 
everyday life, the immediate satisfaction of longing trumped metaphysical 
consistency. 
Benedict's teaching affirms that, before God, the self remains wholly 
itself, even when the effects of deathly fragmentation linger into the after-
life in the separation of soul and body. His position is not that the body 
does not matter, for Christian sensibilities demand that it does. Rather, he 
maintains that the unity of the self-same person—in soul and body—is 
never lost in the presence of God. This unity of the saved self before and 
after bodily resurrection provides a traditional warrant for speaking of the 
activity of the blessed dead as embodied even before the general resurrec-
tion, if not exactly then at least by inference drawn from our eschatological 
destiny. This proleptic warrant enables us to transcend the difference be-
tween Jesus' afterlife and the afterlife of believers prior to resurrection, 
and in such a way that Jesus' afterlife can be paradigmatic for thinking 
about the blessed dead on this side of the eschaton.34 Let us consider, then, 
33
 For a good summary of this controversy, see Bynum, The Resurrection of the 
Body 283-91. 
34
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Mey [Dudley, Mass.: Peeters, 2003] 220). Like Godzieba, I want to respect the 
tradition's meaningful distinction between body and soul in accounting for the 
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the embodied actions of the resurrected Jesus as a heuristic for thinking 
about resurrected life. 
What might it mean for the blessed dead to imitate the way that Jesus 
keeps his promises in resurrected life? The promise that served as our 
earlier example was nothing less than Jesus' divine promise to save the 
world. For creatures, of course, this promise is inimitable since there is no 
respect in which they can make or keep it. In the case of the blessed dead, 
we must consider the eschatological fulfillment of promises made at the 
creaturely level. 
One way of considering the realm of human sinfulness is as a tragic 
collection of broken promises. This conceptualization has its roots in the 
Jewish covenant, which is a set of promissory relationships between God 
and the people of Israel, between God and individual human persons, and 
among human persons. To keep these promissory relationships is to live in 
faithfulness to God and one's neighbor. To break them is to sin. The 
brokenness of sinful lives is nothing other than the brokenness of promises 
to be faithful in relationship. This is not to say that every promise we make 
must be kept in order to be faithful to God, our neighbor, and ourselves. 
As Margaret Farley has demonstrated, many of our promises are condi-
tional, and changes in time and circumstance may require their redefinition 
or even their responsible dissolution.35 As a moral rule, though, the inabil-
ity to keep a promise represents sinful failure, whether the promise is 
explicit or tacitly defined by the expectations of personal relationship. For 
all but the extraordinary saints, death marks the loss of worldly opportunity 
to keep unkept promises or to mend relationships severed by sinful be-
trayal. 
If we imagine the task of discipleship extending into the afterlife, then 
perhaps we can think of the blessed dead as engaged in the moral task of 
promise-keeping. This engagement can be like Jesus' embodied action to 
the extent that the blessed dead continue to be faithful to promises they 
have kept in their earthly lives. Promise-keeping becomes transformative 
imitation of Jesus when the promises broken in the course of earthly life 
are renewed and faithfully kept eschatologically. To imagine the blessed 
dead as active in this way is to imagine them engaged in overcoming sin, 
particularly sin of their own making. Or, to express the same idea from 
another angle, to imagine the blessed dead active in this way is to imagine 
them at work in securing the ties of moral relationship. Since moral rela-
tionship takes shape in a communal setting, there is no reason for us to 
integrity of the self, while not being constrained by a false literalism on either side 
of the distinction. 
3:5
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conceive this activity in a dyadic fashion, as though love, friendship, or 
commitment flourish only between two personal partners, or to conceive 
relationship as transpiring only between the blessed dead. The Catholic 
notion of the communion of the saints assumes that the living and the dead 
are bound together in a network of relationships as the one body of Christ, 
even if we are too accustomed to think of the moral life of the Church 
triumphant as quiescent. And if Martin Buber's existentialist analysis of 
personal relationship can be instructive for thinking about the communion 
of the saints, then no personal relationship in this world or the next tran-
spires without itself sharing in, and being gracefully nourished by, personal 
relationship with God.36 
The advantage to this focus on promise-keeping is that it enables us to 
imagine the communion of the saints as an activity in which the blessed 
dead participate by imitating Jesus' resurrected life. We can observe this as 
well in the second kind of embodied action on the part of the resurrected 
Jesus. We noticed that Jesus bears the pain of his life without reproach. He 
refuses to indict those whose sin has brought him to suffering and death. 
Even though prophetic speech indicts the injustice of sin and can be ex-
traordinarily virtuous, there is something especially inspiring about Jesus' 
unwillingness to blame or even to speak at all of the causes of his suffering. 
A high Christology might explain Jesus' silence as his self-assured confi-
dence in a saving plan scripted from all eternity. Since the events of cross 
and resurrection have destroyed the power of suffering, there is no reason 
for the resurrected Jesus to credit the causes of suffering at all by speaking 
of their power in his life. His silence bespeaks his victory. A better expla-
nation would attend to Jesus' character as demonstrated by his consistent 
actions. In this perspective, Jesus' achievement as a person lies in his will-
ingness to forgive those who have done him harm. Jesus is very explicit in 
offering words of forgiveness in the Gospel of Luke as he hangs dying on 
the cross (Lk 23:34). Attending Jesus' articulate act of forgiveness is the 
striking silence of his unwillingness to reproach those who have done him 
harm. Jesus' refusal to blame should be understood as a behavioral pre-
condition for his forgiveness of both strangers and friends, and thus as an 
indispensable dimension of this astounding act of forgiveness itself. 
It is interesting to notice how closely the ancient creeds join the eschato-
logical events of "forgiveness of sins" and "resurrection of the body." As 
tempting as it may be to understand the forgiveness of sins exclusively as 
an act of God that saves the forgiven, a fuller appreciation would include 
36
 Martin Buber, / and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (New York: MacMil-
lan, 1987) 6,75. David Kelsey insightfully employs the motif of promise-keeping for 
imagining redemption in David H. Kelsey, Imagining Redemption (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox, 2005) 21-41. Kelsey's focus is on the graceful encounter 
with Jesus' redemptive power in this life. 
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the responsibility of believers to forgive those who have done them harm, 
as expected in the only prayer that Jesus taught his disciples (Mt 6:12). This 
activity may take place in earthly life, and yet, in sinful failure, often does 
not. In light of this common failure, perhaps we could imagine the life of 
the blessed dead in the activity of offering forgiveness eschatologically. The 
forgiving actions of the blessed dead imitate Jesus' unwillingness to re-
proach those who have done him harm as the beginning of real forgiveness 
and also the third embodied activity of the resurrected Jesus that we noted 
earlier, namely, his reconciliation of failure. The way Jesus forgives Peter 
makes it very clear that forgiveness is a task that blossoms in the conscious 
work of reconciliation. Jesus' efforts at reconciliation are powerful mani-
festations of grace, and through these actions Jesus allows Peter to renew 
their relationship, profess his love, and enter into his mission. The same 
may be said for the life of the blessed dead. To be a disciple of Jesus means 
that, even in the afterlife, the bonds of reconciliation that unite the com-
munion of the saints must be forged in the work of forgiveness, made and 
remade in acts of love that grace those who forgive as much as those who 
are forgiven. 
BECOMING MOST ONESELF IN RESURRECTED LIFE 
Hans Frei's compelling interpretation of Jesus' resurrection helped us to 
understand what Jesus does in the afterlife, and in a way that embraces all 
his other eschatological actions. Jesus, he noted, becomes most himself in 
his resurrection. His very person, his character as demonstrated in his 
actions, is completed in the events of his resurrected life. We can conclude 
our essay by considering how this last, and most comprehensive, descrip-
tion of Jesus' deeds in the afterlife can serve as a paradigm for the life of 
the blessed dead. 
Applying Frei's description of Jesus' resurrected life to the blessed dead 
immediately poses problems. Jesus, after all, led a sinless life, and so his 
resurrection is easily and consistently imaginable as his personal fulfill-
ment. Indeed, Frei's very point is that careful readers of the Gospel find a 
remarkable continuity between who Jesus was in his earthly life and who 
he is in his afterlife. Any talk of the resurrected fulfillment of believers as 
an imitation of Jesus would need to acknowledge that this imitation, like 
any act of Christian discipleship, is always limited by the transcendence of 
Jesus' divine nature and the transcendence of his sinless humanity. If the 
blessed dead can be described as becoming who they most are in heavenly 
afterlife, then this becoming must be understood as a transformation 
brought about by God's grace. Resurrected life is nothing less than a 
miracle through which, faith holds, believers will become much more than 
who they were in life, and yet in a way that fulfills who they always were. 
In Paul's language, this transformation is a "new creation" in which the 
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power of sin, "everything old," has passed away (2 Cor 5:17). The personal 
continuity of the blessed dead thankfully is not beholden to the standard 
set by Jesus. Their salvation, becoming who they most are, to some degree 
entails becoming who they were not—persons broken by their sin and the 
sin of others. This miraculous continuity, one that yet abides in spite of the 
personal burdens of sin, is largely the work of God's grace. 
The Catholic argument of this essay, though, has proposed that who we 
become in resurrected life continues to transpire by grace and works, and 
has suggested that the resurrected actions of Jesus provide a model for 
discipleship even in the afterlife. For the blessed dead to continue to be 
who they are, they must act in character. But acting in character for the 
blessed dead, being who they truly are even as they are transformed by 
grace, requires their imitation of Jesus. This imitation remains a task, and 
even a challenge, precisely because the effects of sin linger in resurrected 
life. Like the wounds on Jesus' resurrected body, the effects of sin—both 
responsibility for it and its victimizing consequences—continue to inform 
personal identity in resurrected life. This is not to say that sin is still a 
possibility for the blessed dead. The possibility of sin would be a mean-
ingless notion apart from its actuality, and to allow for the actuality of sin 
in the life of the blessed dead would be to concede that redemption could 
be undone. Rather, the transformation that makes the blessed dead who 
they most are is real and meaningful only to the extent that its gracefulness 
neither annuls the effects of sin nor reduces the redeemed to a less than 
personal existence. The effects of sin mark the identity of the person who 
perpetrated and suffered them, just as much as do the salutary effects of 
virtue. And to be a person shaped in identity by both good and evil pre-
supposes rational and willful agency, not only in this life but also in the life 
to come. For the blessed dead to be themselves they must continue to act, 
and act in ways that communicate their character as the saints. To be most 
fully themselves, they must exercise saintly character toward the heritage 
of sin as well as toward the heritage of grace. 
We can imagine this moral activity in the most distant reaches of eternity 
continuing to take place long after the final judgment has been passed on 
all and the number of the saints in heaven is complete. To do so would 
assume that the saints are most themselves not only in blissful repose 
before the glory of the beatific vision but also in the virtuous work of 
forgiveness that is as never-ending as the effects of sin in resurrected life. 
Our appreciation of the communion of the saints increases if we imagine 
the blessed dead presently engaged in the same graceful activity of recon-
ciliation, both among themselves and toward those in earthly life where the 
actuality of sin ever threatens the solidarity of the saintly community. Our 
appreciation of the communion of the saints increases even more if we 
envision this saintly activity not only as the ardent moral behavior of the 
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blessed dead but also as the task of those in earthly life who aspire to 
become most themselves in resurrected life. Just as we imagined that the 
reconciling activity of the blessed dead extends throughout heaven and 
earth, so too should we imagine the same scope of Christian discipleship for 
those in earthly life. While there are differences in the communion of the 
saints, there finally is no difference among all the saints, living and dead, in 
their responsibility to imitate Jesus in all their natural and supernatural 
relationships. 
It may seem as though the description of the blessed dead offered in 
these pages is more an account of life in purgatory than of heavenly life. 
Perhaps this is so because we are unused to imagining the effects of sin 
lasting in heavenly life, and inclined to think that the blessed dead so share 
in the eternal life of God that, like the divine nature, they are impervious 
to the sort of change that the exercise of character demands. For the 
blessed dead to be themselves, though, they must continue to be persons 
shaped by the history of sin. For the blessed dead to be most fully them-
selves, they must continue to act in the afterlife in imitation of Jesus' own 
resurrected life in ways that defeat the burden of sin that they both made 
and suffered. The negotiation of sin is certainly the business of the dead in 
purgatory. But it is important to imagine heavenly life continuing that task 
in its own way, for a lesser conception risks the loss of our selves in all their 
integrity.37 
The images of resurrected life presented here do not aspire to literalism, 
and they certainly do not claim to be exhaustive. They remain interpretable 
acts of the imagination and stand in the company of many others that might 
be warranted by Scripture and tradition. Theology should not shrink from 
the task of thickly describing the eschata, a practice valued highly through-
out Christian history. In spite of the modern dismissal of such activity as 
pious caprice, imagining eschatologically can be a serious measure of faith 
and hope. However modest our results must be, they can be an effective 
rejoinder to the mystical silence that now so easily claims authenticity as 
the most meaningful theology of the afterlife. Our modest results have 
proposed that one answer to our interrogative title is that we may hope to 
be busy in eternity at the work of redemption, whose gift we have received.38 
37
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